NATIONAL SAFETY INSTRUCTION 10

and

Guidance

EQUIPMENT CONTAINING PRESSURISED INTERRUPTING / INSULATING GASES

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## DOCUMENT HISTORY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Summary of Changes /Reason</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Approved By (Title)</th>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>April 2011</td>
<td>Annual review; document amended as detailed below and minor text changes as highlighted in yellow</td>
<td>NSI Review Group</td>
<td>MDE Manager Les Adams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Annual review; document amended as detailed below and minor text changes as highlighted in yellow. NSI 10 Issue 3 incorporated into this document</td>
<td>NSI Review Group</td>
<td>MDE Manager Les Adams</td>
</tr>
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<td>NSI Review Group</td>
<td>ETAM Operations North Manager Mike Dean</td>
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<td>Electricity Transmission Operations Safety Rules Team</td>
<td>Head of ET Operations Matt Staley</td>
</tr>
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<td>Safety Rules Team</td>
<td>Director of ET Asset Operations Matt Staley</td>
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## KEY CHANGES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Amendments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Reference to specific SF6 equipment / gas removed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various</td>
<td>NSI now concentrates on System Safety – detailed technical references are now within the associated TGN(178).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EQUIPMENT CONTAINING PRESSURISED INTERRUPTING / INSULATING GASES

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1 Purpose and Scope

To apply the principles established by the Safety Rules and provide guidance on National Safety Instruction 10, for Personnel working on Equipment containing or which has contained Pressurised Gas.

There is no requirement for Personnel to be formally appointed to this NSI in the following situations:

- When working on Air Insulated Switchgear (AIS) or Gas Insulated Switchgear (GIS) and internal access to a Gas Zone is not required
- When performing operational and safety switching in accordance with Management Procedure NSI 1 "Operational and Safety Switching"
- Routine topping up and / or sampling of Gas Zones in accordance with a routine Risk Assessment and Method Statement (RAMS)

The layout of this guidance note reflects that of legislative codes of practice, where the rule (or mandatory obligation) is identified by a green panel on the left-hand side. The guidance follows after the rule and is identified by a blue panel.

Within National Grid, guidance notes hold equivalent status of an Approved Code of Practice (ACOP) in law. If not followed, you will be required to demonstrate that your safe system of work is of an equal or higher standard.

Further reference to Equipment containing Pressurised Interrupting / Insulating Gas

2 Definitions

Terms printed in bold type are as defined in the Safety Rules.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gas Zone</td>
<td>Discrete sections of Gas Equipment which may comprise of one or more compartments and can be independently isolated and evacuated of Gas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Gas Zone may comprise of:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• A single-phase enclosure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• A single enclosure containing the three phases of an item of Equipment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Three single-phase enclosures of a common item of Equipment connected by inter-phase pipe work</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Designated Gas Zone Access Point Notice</td>
<td>A notice which shall be attached to a Gas Zone access point(s) which requires venting prior to access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vented Gas Zone Access Point Notice</td>
<td>A notice which shall be attached to a Gas Zone which has been Vented and can be entered</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3 Dangers

The System Danger(s) to personnel from Equipment containing gas are, asphyxiation, electric shock, stored energy, poisoning and burns arising from: -

- Oxygen deficiency within a confined space
- Failure of a Point of Isolation or inadvertent energisation
- Contact with by-products
- Failure to control energy within spring / hydraulic mechanisms, face plates under pressure
- Failure of a gas barrier
- The presence of electrical trapped charge or capacitive stored energy arising from the electrical arrangement of the gas filled Equipment and the quality of the gas as a dielectric.
4. General Requirements for Work

4.1 Work areas shall be clearly demarcated.

4.2 When depressurisation is not required to allow work to be done, the following precautions shall be taken to achieve Safety from the System: -

   a) Limiting the work or work area, followed by the issue of a Limited Access Certificate if appropriate
   or
   b) Applying appropriate safety precautions, followed by the issue of a Permit for Work or Sanction for Work

4.1 Demarcation shall be carried out in accordance with Management Procedure NSI 6 – “Demarcation in Substations”.

4.2(a) When the Senior Authorised Person decides it is necessary to confirm these instructions in writing he shall record the assessment and controls to be applied in AMBP 311 RAMS. Where the RAMS controls all Safety from the System hazards there is no requirement to issue a Limited Access Certificate.

Where contractors are carrying out work near to HV Equipment and the means of achieving Safety from the System is by limiting the work or work area, a Senior Authorised Person shall confirm these instructions in writing by the issue of a Limited Access Certificate.

The only exception to this requirement is where the identified work, and / or work area as detailed and controlled in the risk assessment and method statements are limiting in their own right, thus ensuring there is no risk from the System.

4.2(b) Where work is on LV or mechanical parts of the HV Equipment and there is:

- No depressurisation of the Gas Zone
- No Danger from infringement of the HV System
- No operation of Earthing Device(s)

Then there are no requirements to establish HV safety precautions.
Examples of work where HV safety precautions are not required are:

- Timing a Gas circuit breaker where all test leads are external to the Gas Zone and no earth connection is required, for example via:
  - Optical Interface
  - Electrical Transducer
  - Mechanical Transducer.

- Topping up a Gas Zone where Safety Distance is not infringed, and no Point(s) of Isolation are established.

- Work on LV electrical system where Safety Distance and integrity of the Gas Zone are not compromised.

- Work on mechanical systems where Safety Distance and integrity of the Gas Zone are not compromised e.g.:
  - Written Scheme of Examination on safety valve / local air storage vessel
  - Topping up hydraulic system
  - Topping up accumulator
  - Replacement of hydraulic pressure switch / mechanism.

As HV Equipment also contains, LV and Mechanical components safety across control boundaries shall be established and maintained.

If the HV Equipment is required for a short duration outage to enable non-intrusive LV / Mechanical work to be undertaken the following process shall be adopted:

- The Control Person for the LV / Mechanical Equipment shall contact the Control Person (Operation) for the HV Equipment and receive an instruction as per Management Procedure NSI 1 “Operational and Safety Switching”, to take operational control / operate as required the relevant HV Equipment.

- The relevant HV Equipment shall then be selected to local control at either the substation control point or the local control point by the Authorised Person.

- LV and Mechanical safety precautions shall then be established as per the requirements of the Safety Rules.

- On completion of the work the Control Person LV / Mechanical shall contact the appropriate Control Person (Operation) HV to return control of the relevant HV Equipment via an instruction as per Management Procedure NSI 1 “Operational and Safety Switching”.
If the HV Equipment has been transferred to the TNCC due to other work the following process shall be adopted:

- The Control Person for the LV / Mechanical Equipment shall contact the Control Person (Safety) for the HV Equipment and receive an instruction as per Management Procedure NSI 1 “Operational and Safety Switching”, to take operational control / operate as required for the relevant HV Equipment.

- The relevant HV Equipment shall then be selected to either the substation control point or the local control point by the Authorised Person if applicable.

- An “Operate as Required” shall not be instructed on a System State Certificate boundary isolator due to trapped charge issues.

- LV and Mechanical safety precautions shall then be established as per the requirements of the Safety Rules.

- On completion of the work the Control Person LV / Mechanical shall contact the appropriate Control Person (Safety) HV to return control of the relevant HV Equipment via an instruction as per Management Procedure NSI 1 “Operational and Safety Switching”.

4.3 When depressurisation of a Gas Zone is required a Competent Person shall establish the toxicity of the gas contained within the Gas Zone prior to evacuation.

4.3 The Competent Person shall ensure the gas is drawn through a dry filter to avoid contaminating the gas handling equipment. (For further reference see TGN 178)
5 Internal Access to a Gas Zone

5.1 When internal access to a Gas Zone is required the following shall apply:

a) A detailed written risk assessment and method statement shall be produced. The Senior Authorised Person shall assess the work and method statement to ensure that Safety from the System is achieved.

b) The Senior Authorised Person(s) shall ensure that trapped/capacitive charge is fully dissipated prior to the commencement of work, all HV Equipment, associated contacts and conductors to be worked on shall be Earthed to ensure adequate dissipation of trapped/capacitive charge on every part of the HV Equipment. This may be achieved by closing the circuit breaker to solidly earth all modules within the circuit breaker.

c) The Senior Authorised Person shall prepare a Permit for Work or Sanction for Work as appropriate.

d) The Senior Authorised Person shall clearly identify each required access point into the Gas Zone(s) and ensure the appropriate notices are displayed.

e) Where reasonably practicable work within a Gas Zone shall be undertaken with the adjacent Gas Zone(s) reduced to atmospheric pressure. Where it is not reasonably practicable to reduce the adjacent Gas Zone to atmospheric pressure, work shall only be undertaken, provided all the following conditions have been met.

- A vacuum (determined by Manufacturer instructions) has been drawn and maintained in the enclosure to be worked in for 1 hour with the pump isolated

- There is no known or suspected mechanical or electrical damage to the pressurised barrier within the enclosure remaining pressurised

- No known electrical flashover has occurred

- No work on the busbar or barrier which may cause stress to the pressurised barrier shall be undertaken

- A safe system of work is devised and implemented, which shall include, the use of suitable protective equipment to prevent damage to the pressurised barrier

f) Before opening any designated access point(s) the recipient of the Safety Document shall ensure that the relevant Gas Zone(s) is Vented and Section (A) of Gas Zone Access Control Form completed.

g) The recipient of the Safety Document shall ensure that relevant Designated Gas Zone Access Point Notice(s) are replaced with Vented Gas Zone Access Point Notice(s). The recipient of the Safety Document can then give permission for members of the Working Party to open the access point(s) of the relevant Gas Zone.
h) Following opening of the access points, but before Personnel access into the Gas Zone is permitted, the recipient of the Safety Document shall confirm that the Gas Zone is Purged of all gas contents and verify the oxygen content within the Gas Zone. Section (B) of Gas Zone Access Control Form shall be completed.

i) If toxic breakdown products are detected at this point, access to the Gas Zone shall be restricted until removal of the breakdown product has been achieved. (This is achieved by the use of competent external contractors or competent internal staff).

j) When the work requires the Gas Zone to be pressurised or drawn under vacuum, the recipient of the Safety Document, shall ensure that all members of the Working Party are accounted for prior to securing the designated access points. The recipient of the Safety Document shall then withdraw the Working Party and replace the ‘Vented Gas Zone Access Point Notice(s)’ with ‘Designated Gas Zone Access Point Notice(s)’.

The Working Party shall then be informed of the change in state of the Gas Zone and Section (C) of Gas Zone Access Control Form completed. The Gas Zone may then be pressurised or drawn under vacuum.

k) The requirements of points (f / g / h) shall be repeated each time that the method statement requires depressurisation to open any designated access point.

l) The requirements of point (j) shall be repeated each time that the method statement requires the Gas Zone to be pressurised or drawn under vacuum.

m) Upon clearance or transfer of the Safety Document, the Competent Person shall state the condition of the Gas Zone by completing Section (E) or (D) of the Gas Zone Access Control Form immediately prior to the Safety Document clearance or surrender.
5.1(a) The risk assessment and method statement shall detail the hazards and controls appropriate to the work including the stages at which the Gas Zone shall be refilled with the appropriate gas to prevent moisture ingress and subsequently, Vented and Purged to allow safe internal access.

(b) The current Trapped Charge guidance document TNCC_C_03 principally focuses on the control of exposure of insulation to trapped charge (operational) and not Safety from the System considerations. Co-ordination of Dissipating Trapped is done with the appropriate Control Person.

The Senior Authorised Person(s) must fully consider the individual design of the equipment to be worked on and consider trapped / capacitive charge management as a System derived hazard. The precautions required shall be identified in the further precautions section of the Safety Document issued.

The following illustrates the equivalent diagram of a four break GIS circuit breaker, on GIS equipment conventional earthing may not remove the trapped / capacitive charge on the centre interrupters.

When undertaking invasive GIS works, to ensure that trapped charge is fully dissipated prior to the commencement of work, all HV Equipment, associated contacts and conductors to be worked on shall be Earthed to ensure adequate dissipation of trapped charge on every part of the HV Equipment.

(d) When the Safety Document is to be issued with the Gas Zone still at pressure a Designated Gas Zone Access Point Notice shall be used. When the Safety Document is to be issued after completion of Gas Zone venting and purging a Vented Gas Zone Access Point Notice shall be used.

(e) Gas Insulated Switchgear (GIS) is divided into discrete Gas Zones by cast resin barriers (partitions). The majority of Equipment is manufactured to safely withstand full differential pressures across the barrier (i.e. pressure on one side and a vacuum on the other). Operation and Maintenance manuals shall be consulted to confirm full differential pressure can be withstood across the barrier.

(f) The recipient of the Safety Document shall sign; time and date Section (A) of the Gas Zone Access Control Form, refer to Appendix B of this document. For work involving multiple Gas Zones a separate Gas Zone Access Control Form shall be used for each individual Gas Zone.

(h) The oxygen content shall be measured by the use of an appropriate calibrated instrument and the resultant figure recorded on Gas Zone Access Control Form. Personnel access, without breathing apparatus, can only be permitted if the oxygen content is within the range of 19% to 21% and can be maintained within this value throughout the course of the work by suitable ventilation and / or monitoring.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Guidance</th>
<th>NSI 10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(i) **PROCEDURE FOR ENTRY INTO A CHAMBER WHERE THE EXISTENCE OF BY-PRODUCTS IS SUSPECTED OR HAVE BEEN FOUND**

This includes routine entry into any circuit breaker or disconnector Gas Zone containing contacts / interrupters, as well as emergency work following a fault.

A toxicity test shall be carried out on the gas in the Gas Zone, this is to determine if significant abnormal levels of arc product gases are present and assist in fault location.

After a fault, e.g. post arc, at least 24 hours should be allowed to let the molecular sieve absorb gas arc products and then a further period of 1 hour after breaking the vacuum, to allow solid contaminants to settle, before **Personnel** are exposed to the post arc environment.

Before opening a chamber for work, a vacuum will be drawn on the chamber - this is both to evacuate the gas and, in some cases, to prove the integrity of the gas barrier to all adjacent **Point(s) of Isolation**.

If the chamber or a bursting disc has ruptured, in order to establish the integrity of the Gas Zone(s) the following shall apply:

- A **Permit for Work** shall be issued
- Use of appropriate PPE to control any exposure to by-products
- Bursting disc(s) shall be replaced
- Draw a vacuum to determine integrity of the chamber / gas barriers

It will not normally be necessary for the access point to be tented to exclude contamination of the surrounding area, unless advised by the Senior Authorised Person. Tenting may however be necessary to provide a clean environment for subsequent work on the equipment.

The vacuum shall be broken to dry air or nitrogen.

A **Permit for Work** will be issued. Confined space RAMS will be completed by the **Senior Authorised Person** where necessary.

One point of access shall be identified by a **Designated Gas Zone Access Point** notice and opened for the initial inspection by the **Senior Authorised Person** prior to work commencing.

To assist in the opening of the access point, the chamber should be at a very small positive pressure (a few millibars). This pressure shall be released by breaking the seal on the point of entry before completely releasing retaining bolts. This process may result in the release of a small quantity of by-products.
Suitable PPE shall be worn by Personnel involved who may be exposed to gas by-products.

**Senior Authorised Person** shall identify from his initial inspection whether it is necessary for an initial clean to remove arc products. At this stage, if white metal fluorides are observed in small quantities, the **Equipment** should be cleaned using a high efficiency vacuum cleaner by **Personnel** wearing appropriate PPE.

It will not be necessary to tent the area unless a considerable amount of metal fluoride is present, and there is a likelihood of the dust being dispersed beyond the immediate confines of the switchgear.

Once the **Senior Authorised Person** is satisfied that metal fluorides are not present in visible quantities the safety precautions adopted for gas by-products need no longer be taken and work can proceed after a new **Permit for Work** detailing the revised further precautions is issued. Clean conditions clothing shall be worn when working in gas switchgear.

(j) At each stage of the works requiring evacuation of the gas, the recipient of the **Safety Document** shall ensure that any gas in the **Gas Zone** is recovered in accordance with National Grid Environmental Policy, relevant manufacturer “Operational and Maintenance Manual” and Technical Guidance Note 178.
Appendix A - Flow Chart for Working Adjacent to Pressurised Barriers

Work to be undertaken within a Gas Zone

Is the Equipment designed to withstand differential pressure across the barrier?

Yes

Is it Reasonably Practicable to reduce adjacent Gas Zone to atmospheric pressure?

Yes

Can a vacuum be drawn and maintained in the enclosure to be worked in for 1 hour with the pump isolated?

No

Has an electrical flashover occurred?

Yes

Is the work liable to cause stress to the busbar or pressurised barrier?

No

Can a safe system of work be devised and implemented, which should include, if necessary, the use of suitable protective equipment to prevent damage to the barrier?

Yes

Adjacent Gas Zone(s) to be reduced to atmosphere

No

Yes / No

Yes

Adjacent Gas Zone(s) may remain pressurised

Yes / No

No
# Appendix B - Gas Zone Access Control Form

Initial Condition of Gas Zone e.g. SF₆ / G₃ / N₂ / O₂ / and pressure Positive / Negative:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Safety Document Number</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Gas Zone Identification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

A) Confirmation Gas Zone **Vented**  
B) Confirmation Gas Zone **Purged** of Gas  
(If internal access required O₂ %)

C) Confirmation Designated Access Points Secured and Working Party withdrawn prior to pressurisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Signature</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Signature</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Oxygen (%)</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Signature</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Working Party No:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

D) Condition of Gas Zone at Safety Document Transfer:

# Delete as Appropriate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Competent Person Surrendering Safety Document</th>
<th>New Safety Document Recipient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Signature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

E) Condition of Gas Zone at Safety Document Clearance e.g. SF₆ / G₃ / N₂ / O₂ # and pressure Positive / Negative #

Note: Form to be filed in maintenance file on completion
Appendix C - Authorisation Matrix for Contractors Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contractor Personnel</th>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Competent Person</th>
<th>Authorised Person</th>
<th>Senior Authorised Person</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sections</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Contractors Personnel

Contractors by law have a duty to provide a safe system of work for their employees.

National Grid have a duty in law to employ competent Contractors to undertake work on Gas Equipment and provide them with National Grid’s safe system of work to enable them to develop their own safe systems of work.

National Grid Supply Chain Management processes ensure competent Contractors are selected.

Once a competent Contractor is selected, National Grid has a duty to ensure the Contractor understands Danger(s) associated with undertaking work within a HV compound, permit systems, demarcation and safe access and egress, including movement of objects and vehicles etc. This is accomplished by Contractors employees being authorised to National Grid Safety Rules and to NSI 6 and 8, via Management Procedure - NSI 30 “Appointment of Persons”.

The Contractor selected shall be an expert in the area of Gas Equipment and therefore there is no requirement for authorisation under NSI 10.

Before a Safety Document is issued the Senior Authorised Person shall be authorised to NSI 10 and shall ensure the Contractors risk assessment and method statements cover the Danger(s) identified in NSI 10.

The National Grid Senior Authorised Person will issue a Safety Document to a Contractors Competent Person authorised to NSI 6 & 8.